There are a lot of talking points about running backs in the recent decade that constantly get pushed by many media outlets and continue to be regurgitated by fans as if it is the Gospel. The issue with these anti-running back sentiment is that it involves takes that can be misleading, not accurate, or can apply to many other positions. Often, when someone sprouts a commonly bad take on running backs that gets disproven, the individual will then move the post by changing their anti-running back argument to something else. This article will break down all of the narratives and explain the issues and falsehoods associated with each.

Running Backs are Replaceable (One Can Get Similar Production from Any Other Running Back)

This is a common and most lazy talking point. It is simply not true. Certain running backs are elite as they have some combination of incredible vision, speed, trucking, special moves, finding holes, creating holes, catching, and blocking. Many elite running backs are able to leverage their gravity as a player to the point where it forces defenses to commit a safety in the box, thus opening up the drop back passing game on early downs and the play action game. Teams aren’t putting a safety in the box to stop Hassan Haskins. They are putting a safety in the box to stop Derrick Henry. Defensive coordinators literally spend hours during the week to game plan for specific running backs that are elite. As a result, to claim that they are all replaceable is childish.

You Can Get a Running Back Anywhere in the Draft

When someone refutes the replaceable running back theory, the response would usually be to say that you can find an elite back anywhere. This is simply not true. When people make this comment, they usually say that you can find an adequate running back anywhere in the draft. Even though this may be the case, it is also pointless to bring up because you can find a decent backup, spot starter, or average starter from almost any position in the draft. Once in a while, there will be a super star running back that was drafted in the later rounds or even go undrafted but that is also the case with every other position.

When talking about the value of a position, you have to look at the impact of the position when it is played at an elite level. As a result, when we see teams draft players in the first couple of rounds, the expectation is that the player is going to be a star, let alone an elite player. When a team drafts a running back in the first round, they are expecting him to be an impact player. Admonishing such a pick with the statement that you can find some back anywhere is disingenuous because that team isn’t looking for an average back, they are looking for a difference maker. Sadly, there are those that actually believe one can find an elite back in the later rounds with just as much frequency as those in the first round.

The following chart, courtesy of Rockmnation. It shows that the list of all-pro running backs in the last decade (specifically from 2009-2018).

In this list, all but one of the all-pro running backs were drafted in the first 3 rounds. There was not some common occurrence of random mid and late round picks that became superstar backs like how the pundits and some fans like to claim. The one player not drafted in the first 3 rounds was undrafted Arian Foster. Of these 13 players on the chart, 6 of them (almost half) were first round picks. Another 3 were second round picks. Basically, 9 of the 13 running backs selected to all pro teams were drafted in the first 2 rounds.

For very recent examples, the chart below (courtesy of takethissports.com) shows the same type of chart but for running backs since 2019. The data is from Pro Football Reference.

The chart shows that of the 6 players that have made the pro bowl since 2019, only 1 of them was drafted later than the first two rounds (Alvin Kamara). In the case of Alvin Kamara, he ended up still being a 3^rd round pick at latest. He was not some 6^th round pick or undrafted player. These charts show that the vast majority of great running backs are going to be in the earlier rounds and that finding someone at that level after the first few rounds is nothing more than just a fluke. It is not a viable draft strategy.

The following graph shows the likelihood of a running back having a successful career above a replacement level player (such as making multiple pro-bowls and all-pros) based on their draft position. LeSean McCoy was drafted in the second round while Alfred Morris was drafted in the 5^th round and Jay Ajayi was drafted in the 6^th draft.

The data below is courtesy of Reddit user u/paulg66

The graph shows that the higher you draft a running back, the more likely he is going to be a productive player for multiple seasons. It is because there is a higher chance that he is probably more talented and skilled. Who would’ve thought?

You Can Replace a Star Running Back’s Production with a Running Back by Committee or a Good Offensive Line

This isn’t true. A special running back garners a lot of attention in game planning. A star running back can give a team a solid floor of rushing production over multiple seasons in their prime. Meanwhile, a running back by committee is not guaranteed to give such a floor due to its reliance on a collection of average running backs that might struggle to maintain even decent production over a year and are more susceptible to variables changing for the worst around them (decline in the offensive line’s run blocking).

Also, it is difficult to have a very productive offensive line that average backs can have success with over multiple seasons since it requires all five guys to play at a very high level within the same run blocking scheme while on the same page together. This also requires the run blocking scheme to be effective without defenses figuring it out after a few seasons. The likelihood of that and of 5 guys all playing well together over multiple is smaller and harder to sustain than one guy playing well for multiple seasons.

We have seen teams in recent years try to replace super star backs with a running back by committee and it did not lead to great rushing results. As a result, the team either got worse or succeeded but in spite of the running game. In the following five seasons after losing Marshawn Lynch, the seahawks have tried to replicate similar rushing production after losing Marshawn Lynch. However, the impact was not the same and the team never made it back to a conference championship despite the legion of boom still being there until the end of 2017.

The Rams rushing production dropped noticeably in the following years after Gurley’s knee reduced his effectiveness after the end of the 2018 season despite having mostly the same offensive line. Cam Akers was productive in 2020 but did not come close to matching prime Gurley’s production. The franchise won a Super Bowl in 2021 but they barely did it in spite of a run game. They had to upgrade the quarterback position with Stafford and rely on a healthy Cooper Kupp that wasn’t available in the Rams 2018 Super Bowl run. They didn’t do it because they were somehow able to match prime Gurley’s rushing production with a committee of running backs.

The Rams winning in spite of an effective game ended up not being sustainable in 2022 as the team couldn’t lean on an effective running back to slow down pass rushes that were going after Stafford and the struggling Rams’ offensive line en route to a 5-12 season. It is also worth noting that Todd Gurley wasn’t healthy during the 2018 postseason, which also hurt the team’s chances of winning their Super Bowl matchup in 2018.

Ezekiel Elliot fell out of his prime but the Cowboys got good production from Tony Pollard. He is a 4^th round pick but, as stated earlier, is a fluke. Pollard’s effectiveness in replacing Ezekiel Elliot (albeit in a limited role and not reaching 2016 Elliot’s peaks) actually goes against the idea of replacing a superstar with a running back committee but was an example of one super star player being replaced by a pretty good player. The San Francisco 49ers tried a running back by committee during Shanahan’s time there. They had success with it in 2019 as the team ran for over 2300 yards in their Super Bowl season. As stated earlier, this approach to the run game is not sustainable over multiple seasons since it requires the starting offensive line, the average backs, and the run blocking scheme to stay on top of defenses over multiple seasons.

Kyle Shanahan and the 49ers realized they needed a true playmaker at that defense that could force a safety in the box to make life easier in the play action and drop-back passing game for their quarterbacks (Jimmy Garoppolo and Brock Purdy). This is why they traded assets away for Christian McCaffrey in 2022. By the end of the 2022 season, the 49ers were able to reach similar team rushing statistics as their 2019 season with McCaffrey’s help. This isn’t even including McCaffrey’s contribution in the pass game.

All Running Backs Need a Very Good/Great Offensive Line to Succeed

This is another lie and probably one of the dumbest takes out there. For someone to actually espouse this would mean that they literally have never watched a good running back or their biases are so strong that they have created a false reality for themselves that suits their agenda. Many good to great running backs can create more yards for themselves and be very effective even with a mediocre and even bad offensive line. A running back with excellent vision, ability to find and create new holes, ability to break tackles and run after contact, and ability to juke and spin past defenders are able to manage if their offensive line is not that good.

Obviously, the better the offensive line is then the easier things will be for the back. However, that is the nature of any position in football and with any situation that anyone is in during their life that they can benefit from additional help. An elite quarterback can manage and even excel if some components around them are lackluster (skill position players, scheme, offensive line, lack of a run game) but they will be even better if all of those components were great around them. For some reason, people like acting as though the running back position is the only position that interacts with other positions, and people like to pretend that they can only be good if their teammates are good. There are countless examples that dispel the false narrative. People like to forget that Todd Gurley won rookie of the year in 2015 by rushing for over 1100 yards, averaging 4.8 yards per carry, and earning 10 touchdowns on the ground. He did this before Sean McVay ever got there and did behind one of the worst offensive lines in the league that season which ranked 27^th in run block win rate, according to Pro Football Focus.

The Cleveland Browns have some good offensive linemen that play with Nick Chubb but the running back has had productive seasons even when the offensive line was not producing holes for him. An example of this is in 2019 when Nick Chubb averaged 5.19 yards per carry. Only 0.72 of those yards came before contact while 4.47 yards came after contact. This means that Chubb isn’t afforded the opportunity by his offensive line to pass 1 yard before he is met at the backfield with defenders ready to tackle him. As a result, almost all of the yards he averages are from his own skills in being able to create yards for himself. The same goes for Derrick Henry that same year. He averaged 4.93 yards per carry with 0.72 of those yards coming before contact. This meant he had to 4.21 yards after the contact by himself. This is courtesy of Pro Football Focus.

For a very recent example, one can look at Saquan Barkley’s 2022 season in which he rushed for over 1300 yards, 4.4 yards per carry, and 10 touchdowns. According to ESPN Analytics Index, the New York Giants ranked 26^th in run block win rate which is at the bottom of the league. Rhamondre Stevenson is a young and emerging back that managed to get a 1000 yard season with 5 yards per carry despite the New England Patriots ranking 32^nd in run block win rate. Breece Hall had a short lived rookie season in 2022 but managed to accumulate 463 yards on only 80 carries with a yards per attempt of 5.8 despite the Jets ranking 30^th in run block win rate. The Jets were 5-2 with him and when he went down with injury, they finished 2-8 despite having many stars at other positions such as Quinnen Williams and Sauce Gardner. These aforementioned run block rate statistics are from the same ESPN Analytics Index source.

When looking at a larger sample size of years, the chart below shows how great, very good, and even decent backs were able to rank high in rushing yards while having struggling run blocking offensive lines. These offensive lines were ranked in the bottom of the league in adjusted line yards, a statistic that is meant to differentiate the contributions to a run play between what the offensive line does and what the running back does on his own. A low ranking for adjusted line yards for a team suggests that the offensive line is not contributing much to a running back’s gained yards. The chart also show the yards per carry these backs had in those seasons. It averaged out to 4.23 which is impressive considering how these running backs were playing behind some of worst run blocking lines in terms its ability to contribute to an effective run game.

This chart is from “The Sea Hawker Podcast”. It has been edited (courtesy of takethissports.com) to have a yards per carry section such information from Pro Football Reference.

Running Back Contracts are a Huge Risk Due to Running Backs’ Lack of Health and Longevity Afterwards

This is an exaggerated take many have. When presenting all of the above rebuttals to previously established false narratives, many will then switch to the idea that one should not give a second contract to an elite running back. They will argue that it is a massive risk since the running back will fall off a cliff very quickly or get hurt which will then not make the contract worth it. A player not living up to big contract is obviously a risk but it is not a risk that only applies to running backs. In recent years, people will bring up how Ezekiel Elliot, DeMarco Murray, and Le’Veon Bell had many carries which led to them losing their productiveness once signed. Gurley’s knee problems and David Johnson not being productive once he got an extension were also examples of failed running back contracts. There is some valid concern if this could be a growing trend in recent years.

However, in regards to health and general production, people ignore how Nick Chubb, Derrick Henry (outside of the foot injury from the second half of 2021), Aaron Jones, LeSean McCoy (was very productive for the first 3 years of his 5 year deal for the Bills), and Alvin Kamara have been fairly healthy on their second contracts. It has been more of a mixed bag rather than a certain failed investment as it pertains to resigning running backs. There is legitimate risk at every position when giving a player a big contract.

There was a period of time in the mid-2010 when tight ends, cornerbacks, and linebackers were receiving contracts that ended up being really bad. Some noticeably bad tight end contracts included Julius Thomas’ contract with the Jacksonville Jaguars after a few good seasons in Denver and Jordan Cameron’s contract with the Miami Dolphins after a good season with the Cleveland Browns in 2014. A current bad contract is the one belonging to Darren Waller. He is a very skilled player that signed a 3 year extension in 2022 despite an injury plagued 2021 and then ended up missing 5+ games in 2022. He is now 30 years old. Jonnu Smith’s contract with the Patriots was awful considering he never eclipsed more than 40 catches in a season while with the Titans and then never eclipsed more than 30 catches a year in New England.

Many cornerbacks over the last 7+ years have failed to live up to their contracts such as Jason McCourty on the Titans, Brandon Flowers on the Chargers, and Brandon Carr on the Cowboys. The Jets’ 2015 contract with Darrell Revis ended up being a horrible contract as he was productive for the first year before declining the year after and then parting ways afterwards only the age of 31. This isn’t even mentioning the dreadful 6 year contract that he signed in 2013 following a season in which he had just torn his ACL. His injury in 2012 was clearly a risk that the Buccaneers took when signing him and it failed. It wasn’t any less of a risk because he wasn’t a running back.

JC Jackson’s contract got off to a poor start as he struggled in 2012 before tearing his ACL that same season. We will now have to see if he will recover fully in time to have an impactful 2023 season or not. Jamal Adams is a safety in 2020 that the Seahawks traded 2 first round picks for and gave him the biggest contract for his position. He has been a good blitzer but is not great in coverage and missed almost all of 2022.

Linebackers have also had risky contracts in the 2010s and now as well. NoVarro Bowman signed an extension in 2013 but missed all of 2014 due to injury. He had a pro bowl season in 2015 before declining and then retiring in the subsequent seasons. Brian Cushing signed an extension in 2014 and had some productive seasons but did reach any of the peaks or impact that he had early in his career on his rookie deal. Current player Shaquille Leonard signed an extension in 2022 after a great start to his career but barely played in 2022 due to a neck injury. He is obviously early into his contract so there is time for him to get back healthy and live up to it but it remains to be seen.

There have been some bad wide receiver contracts in recent years such as Marvin Jones due to lack of production and especially Kenny Golladay due to poor production and availability. Michael Thomas is a great receiver but ever since his extension, he has not been available for the most part due to injuries from 2020-2022. He is now approaching his 30s. Allen Robinson signed with the Rams in 2022 but struggled to get separation and was traded after one year. He is 30. These are just some of the many risky and bad contracts as more could be named for other positions but that will take too long.

There have been some noticeably bad quarterback contracts that involved players that were young but involved doubts as to whether they could carry the team if more is asked of them and sustain success (Carson Wentz and Jared Goff). There have also been contracts with aging players that are not or have not lived up to the length of the deal to various degrees (Matthew Stafford, Russell Wilson, Matt Ryan, and the Aaron Rodgers contract he signed heading into 2022). Obviously, the quarterback position is the most important position so it is worth taking huge risk due to how impact that position can be. When comparing running backs to other non-quarterback positions, there is still a risk in signing a long term deal to a running back as there is to an edge rusher, safety, wide receiver, guard, and more.

All of these positions are susceptible to injuries, lack of commitment to staying productive, wrong scheme fit, and overall prime longevity as one approaches their late 20’s and early 30’s. There are many players in all of the positions (outside of quarterback) that start to slow down at even age 29. Seriously, go look up how many notable players that have played their careers and see when they got washed. The running back takes a beating but the longevity of these other positions are not that much longer than many feel comfortable admitting.

Running Backs Cannot Lead a Team to the Super Bowl

This is a misleading statement. First and all, we have seen elite running backs carry mediocre teams to the playoffs. In 2012, Adrian Peterson rushed for over 2000 yards on 6 yards per carry in a historic MVP season coming off a torn ACL to take an otherwise unremarkable Vikings team to the playoffs. When Peterson had regular excellent seasons in 2011 and 2013 (averaging 4.6 yards per attempt in both seasons with his 2011 season cut short at 12 games) the team finished 3-13 and 5-10-1.

In 2012, the team had a few pro bowlers in Jarrett Allen and Kyle Rudolph but the quarterback play during the period was not good. Peterson managed to lead the team to the playoffs despite the bad quarterback play from Christian Ponder and with one of his best and dynamic teammates, Percy Harvin, missing the second half of the season. In the playoffs, the team didn’t even have Christian Ponder but managed to play with an even worse quarterback that could barely throw in Joe Webb. He went 11-30 for 180 yards in the game. His poor passing stymied the offense with Peterson’s 99 yards and 4.5 yards per carry.

In recent years, Derrick Henry led a good Tennessee Titans team to the AFC Title game in 2019 and to multiple playoff appearances and division titles in the subsequent seasons. He has a good but not elite quarterback in Ryan Tannehill. His playoff numbers in games that they were eliminated were not entirely impressive. However, if Tannehill had played better in high leverage situations in the postseason, it could have opened things up for the rest of the offense. Early in Henry’s career, he was still a factor on the ground in his team’s comeback victory against the Chiefs in the AFC wild card game. This is special since conventional knowledge suggests that a team can’t run the ball to get back in the game. 

Ray Rice was a productive player for the late 200s/early 2010s Baltimore Ravens teams that won the Super Bowl in 2012. He made multiple pro bowls and a couple of all-pros. The team’s starting quarterback was a good but not great quarterback in Joe Flacco that played well in the 2012 Super Bowl run. This was one of the few times when a star running back was able to be a part of a Super Bowl winning team in the last decade even with a good but not great quarterback.

Todd Gurley came close to winning a Super Bowl with a quarterback that was good but not great in Jared Goff. Gurley was first team all pro on a very good team that was Super Bowl bound. However, by the time the team got to the big game, Gurley was dealing with a knee issue that limited his effectiveness. One of the team’s other best players in Cooper Kupp missed the postseason due to an ACL injury. These factors played a role in the Rams falling short of being a fairly recent team to win the Super Bowl with a super star running back as one of its best players.

Marshawn Lynch was one of the main focal points in the early-mid 2010s Seattle Seahawks run along with Russell Wilson, Pete Carroll, Bobby Wagner, and the Legion of Boom. In 2016, Ezekiel Elliot had a great season as he along with fellow rookie Dak Prescott led the Dallas Cowboys to a 13-3 record. While still in his prime, he along with quarterback Dak Prescott led the Cowboys back to the playoffs in 2018 with Zeke having another 1400+ yard season. The team won a playoff game with his strong performance before losing in the divisional round.

Now, many will look at these examples (outside of Lynch’s Seahawks and Rice’s Ravens) by saying there is a limit to how far you can go in the postseasons with a feature back being your best or one of your best players. They will mention how star backs will eventually have a game where the opponent’s defense shuts them down, the passing game isn’t good enough to take advantage of the running back’s gravity, or the team is behind and has to throw instead of run much. Even though this has been the case, it doesn’t make sense to knock the running back position for this as much.

For a super star running back to even have the ability to carry a mediocre team to the postseason or lead a solid team (without a great quarterback) on a playoff run is incredibly impressive for a non-quarterback position. Treating it like an indictment makes no sense because virtually any other non-quarterback fails to even have that kind of impact on a team. The closest thing to a position that isn’t a running back or quarterback carrying a team was JJ Watt’s 2014 season in which he had 20.5 sacks and finished second in MVP voting. The team finished 9-7 despite a lack of consistency at quarterback. Justin Jefferson’s 2022 season is another example of this as he caught 128 catches for over 1800 yards as the team won a lot of close games en route to a 13-4 record but wild card playoff exit. Seriously, has a left tackle led a team to playoffs, let alone Super Bowl? A linebacker? A cornerback? A guard? Ask yourself this question.

The running back position is essentially being punished for being more impactful than other positions but not impactful enough to win the Super Bowl. The position is being held to a completely different standard. The irony is that when people claim a star running back doesn’t matter because they can’t lead a team to a Super Bowl (especially in the modern era) they are inadvertently praising a star running back by suggesting that they can be very impactful but just not as much as a quarterback. Heck, usually when a quarterback wins an MVP, it is usually the best quarterback on a really good to great team.

Adrian Peterson’s season was special in how he won 10 games with a team that would barely be considered mediocre. The reality is that many of the elite running backs have not had the luxury of playing with an elite quarterback in their primes on good teams. Other elite players on other positions have had that opportunity so when the team wins a Super Bowl, people greatly value (and sometimes overrate) that non-quarterback position.

Whereas, when a running back doesn’t get that chance, we don’t see them win a Super Bowl and then think they are worthless or are even a hindrance towards winning a Super Bowl. Marshall Faulk playing with Kurt Warner was one of the last times a team had elite players at those two positions on excellent teams and it led to them winning the Super Bowl. If Deshaun Watson gets back to being elite in 2023 then it would be a rare occasion where an elite quarterback gets to play with an elite running back on a supposedly really good team.

Super Bowl Teams Don’t Need a Star Running Back

The issue with this comment is that the only position that a Super Bowl winning team specifically needs is an elite quarterback and if they don’t have one then they better have one that is very good or at least capable of playing very well when it matters. When it comes to non-quarterback positions, a Super Bowl caliber team simply needs a handful of blue-chip players (elite) at any position next to a very good to great quarterback and solid coaching to excellent coaching. A Super Bowl winning team also requires a solid to good collection of complimentary players or a few players that were once elite but are still good and bring experience. An example of the latter is the 2021 Los Angeles Rams that had Von Miller, Odell Beckham Jr., and Andrew Whitworth. Another example of the latter is the 2018 New England Patriots that had Devin McCourty, Julian Edelman, and Rob Gronkowski. A third example is the 2012 Baltimore Ravens that had Ray Lewis, Terrell Suggs, and Anquan Boldin.

The 2013 Seattle Seahawks team that won the Super Bowl had 2 elite safeties (Earl Thomas and Kam Chancellor), an elite cornerback (Richard Sherman), elite running back (Marshawn Lynch), elite center (Max Unger), and a very good young quarterback (Russell Wilson). They also had a very good linebacker in Bobby Wagner that very quickly became elite a year later in 2014. The team had a good defensive line led by Michael Bennett to complement the secondary stars, a good cornerback in Brandon Browner for a few years there, a decent receiving core, and a very good head coach (Pete Carroll) that coached to the team’s strengths.

People believe that other non-quarterback positions outside running back are significantly more valuable for a Super Bowl winning team than a running back because we’ve rarely (by coincidence) seen an elite running back get to play on the same team as an elite quarterback in recent years as previously stated. If Brett Favre doesn’t throw the pick at the end of the 2009 NFC Title game against the Saints, he and Adrian Peterson are both in the Super Bowl.

The following charts shows the primary starters on Super Bowl winning teams and whether they were a pro bowler (unless the player’s Approximate Value is significantly low which suggests they weren’t worthy of pro bowl vote), all-pro, or at least played at that level that season (such as having a pro bowl caliber year but missing some time led to the snub, evident by having a high Approximate Value number of 9+, according to Pro Football Reference) – Names that are in bold signify that they are applicable. – It is basically meant to show if a player was top 5 (not just 10) in their position that year.

• When partially using Approximate Value, there are some exceptions when it is ignored for certain players’ whose rankings are skewed higher because of the production of their side of the ball (ex. David Edwards having a high AV when he isn’t a pro bowler level guard). As a result, his AV being high at 10 is ignored.
• L-EDGE stands for 4-3 left defensive end/left pass rushing 3-4 outside linebacker
• R-EDGE stands for 4-3 right defensive end/right pass rushing 3-4 outside linebacker
• IDL stands for interior defensive lineman
• OLB stands for outside linebacker that is not a primary pass rusher (ex. a 4-3 outside linebacker)
• If a star player didn’t finish the season and did not play in the Super Bowl then he won’t be here (ex. 2016 Gronkowski)
• If a star played virtually the whole season and postseason but missed the Super Bowl, then their name will still be counted (ex. Michael Bennett 2013).
• Some of the players not highlighted were still but might have been elite in the past in their primes (ex. 2020 Rob Gronkowski), have had elite seasons around 3-4 year period but maybe not in that specific season (ex. 2020 Mike Evans), or were starting to emerge as future elite players (ex. 2020 Vita Vea).

The aforementioned charts show that arguing one doesn’t need an elite running back to win a Super Bowl is pointless because you technically don’t need an elite player to play a specific non-quarterback position to win a Super Bowl. Almost all of these positions have around a similar amount of elite players that were part of Super Bowl winning teams in the last decade. The only non-quarterback position that sticks out as having a noticeably higher representation is the cornerback position. Another interesting finding is that the left tackle position, a position that is coveted when building around a quarterback, only has 1 elite representative on a Super Bowl winning team in the last decade. As a whole, the data simply shows that a Super Bowl winning team usually should at least have some elite players, regardless of position, with other good and or once elite but still good players.

As we all know, the biggest factor is obviously having an elite quarterback or at least a capable quarterback that can play very well. Tom Brady and Patrick Mahomes have led 6 of the last 12 Super Bowl winning teams with different combinations of elite players from different types of positions, not necessarily a few specific ones. It can be argued that 2018 Tom Brady was very good instead of elite. The 2018 Patriots were unique in that they had 1 elite non-quarterback that season. They did have multiple very good players (Edelman) which included some of whom were capable of bringing out elite play sometimes (Gronkowski).

The two Super Bowls teams led by Patrick Mahomes did not include an elite cornerback. The 2016 Super Bowl winning team led by Tom Brady did not have an elite tight end such as Gronkowski available to finish the second half of the season or be involved in the postseason run. Those two aforementioned facts are meant to reemphasize that no one non-quarterback position is specifically needed on a Super Bowl winning team but rather it is usually important to just have some non-quarterbacks that are elite regardless of position.

The Broncos winning in 2015 despite mediocre to poor play from Brock Osweiler and Peyton Manning appears to be an outlier due to a generational defense that had multiple very good to elite defensive players. The 2017 Eagles had a strong performance from backup Nick Foles but the starting quarterback Carson Wentz played at an elite level that year to guide them to a strong enough record before Foles took over very late in the season. Eli Manning was an elite quarterback in 2011 while 2012 Joe Flacco, 2013 Russell Wilson, and 2021 Matthew Stafford were very good in their respective Super Bowl seasons.

Teams Winning Super Bowls Don’t Have Running Backs Make up a Bunch of the Team’s Salary Cap

It is a misleading statement. Very recent Super Bowl Winning teams haven’t had an expensive running back on their team because they haven’t had an elite back in the first place. The response will be that it shows that a team doesn’t need an elite running back, let alone a highly paid one, to win a Super Bowl. The rebuttal is virtually the same as it is for the previous argument above which is that one doesn’t specifically need an expensive player from a specific position on a Super Bowl winning team. There aren’t specific positions that have an elite player in which a team needs to invest a certain percentage of their cap towards. They just need to have some elite players (assuming they are not on rookie contracts), regardless of position, that they are likely paying highly (due to the market value) on a Super Bowl team with a very good to great quarterback (whether on a large contract or rookie deal).

The chart shows the cap allocation for players on the 2013 Seattle Seahawks team. It is courtesy of Sportstrac.

The chart shows Seattle Seahawks Marshawn Lynch was one of the highest paid players on the team in 2013 and was one of the players that allocated the most cap on the team. The team ended up winning the Super Bowl.

Star Running Backs Don’t Take You to a Super Bowl

This is misleading and has already been addressed already. The lack of star running backs on Super Bowl winning teams is merely circumstantial. They have mostly been stuck with bad, mediocre, or slightly above average quarterback play. Nick Chubb has played with Baker Mayfield, Jacoby Brissett, and a rusty 2022 Deshaun Watson. Other star players of other positions would not and have not fare much without an elite quarterback outside of a generational defense or outlier loaded team that has a very good quarterback. If Derrick Henry got to play with Patrick Mahomes or Tom Brady on a very good team for multiple seasons, do you honestly think they wouldn’t win at least one ring? Of course they do.

Teams Don’t Value the Running Back Position Anymore

This is not true. Teams do value the running back position. They just don’t want to financially invest in it that much. If they didn’t value the position, then teams like the Raiders and Giants would simply let Jacobs and Barkley walk in free agency when a long term extension agreement wasn’t met that the teams preferred. The fact that the team would franchise tag the players means that they value their contributions to the team but want to extract as much production with as little financial compensation as possible since the franchise tag for running backs has not increased over the last decade.

The New Perspective

Some Solutions to Concerns Pertaining to Running Backs

Teams can offer a running back in his prime a 3 year deal with a good annual salary that simply has the guarantees in the first 2 years (which benefits the team) but with relatively high bonus in that time period (which satisfies the player). In the last few years, teams have started doing this such as with the contracts given to Henry, Chubb, and Aaron Jones. The Giants offered Barkley a 3 year deal but he had issues with the guarantees and annual salary. If the team and player are a couple of millions apart in the annual salary and guarantees then it isn’t worth it for the team to stall on talks because the concern with contracts is the long term production.

If the team is confident the player will be productive for at least the next two seasons, then paying that player an extra few millions isn’t a concern especially assuming the cap hit isn’t too crazy. It is about the team protecting themselves from the long term depreciation of the contract if the player declines. Honestly, this same contract length could be advantageous to give out to other positions since they do not have that much better longevity. If a team instead elects to give out a longer term such as 5+ years then the last few years should basically be voided years meant to create cap flexibility. It should actually be a 5 year but virtually a 3-4 year deal instead.

Many teams will still want to either not offer such a deal to a running back or make sure that the guarantees and annual salary is still lower than the star running back would like due to the franchise tag not being as high. The top 5 salaries calculated for a position each year over the last 5 years are used to determine the franchise tag for each position. In order to solve this issue, star running backs that are already playing on their second contracts (Christian McCaffrey, Derrick Henry, and Alvin Kamara) will need to continue to play well and even better in 2023 on those deals so that they can stay on their teams under those contracts in 2024. By doing this, they will either play in 2024 with the relatively high cap hits or slightly lesser cap hits from a contract restructure that won’t be too low. This will help raise the averages of the top five salaries for the position in recent years which lead to a slight increase in the running back franchise tag. According to overthecap.com, the franchise tag for that position is expected to increase from roughly 10 million to 13 million in 2024.

In the following seasons, if star running backs stay productive on their second contracts then the franchise tag will continue to improve based on the aforementioned explanation. Having a high franchise tag for a position will incentive teams giving a long term deal to a running back to have the guarantees and annual salaries be increased in order to increase the likelihood of the player signing it. The reason is because a one year high franchise tag is not convenient in terms of how it impacts the team’s cap space and cap flexibility. Giving a long term deal that the player would accept would be better for the cap space. If the team and player do not reach an agreement on a deal but the team doesn’t want to give a high franchise tag, then it will lead to the team being willing to allow the running back to test free agency. A player going to free agency will then be able to see what they are truly worth in the open market and can choose to go to the highest bidder, thus setting the market at that position. Setting the market with a big annual contract will help with the position annual average which would then increase the positions’ franchise tag.

This is why running backs doing what they can to increase the franchise tag will help lessen the leverage teams have. In short, a low franchise tag on a position makes it too advantageous for a team to simply low ball a player on a long term deal. If the player refuses the deal then the team will just give them the small tag that won’t hurt the team as much on the cap. It will also suppress the players’ ability to gauge his value in free agency. Another factor to look at is the current running backs playing well on second contracts for the next few seasons will make teams in future years less wary about giving about long term deals with higher guarantees because they will have more examples of it working.

Some may respond to this solution by arguing that running backs are not going to be able to play well on their second contracts to eventually increase the position’s leverage in the future due to injuries and wearing down. The response is that there is a way to increase the likelihood of more running backs staying productive on their second contracts and it is already happening. When teams get a star running back, they should have a viable backup to take some of the carries so that the star running back isn’t accumulating too many carries. Doing this will increase the likelihood that they will have longer careers.

Derrick Henry shared carries with DeMarco Murray early in Henry’s career. Henry’s case is a little extreme because he technically didn’t start in many of the games in his first 2 seasons despite receiving over 100 carries each of those years. Nick Chubb shared some carries with Kareem Hunt for Chubb’s first few years. Adrian Peterson also shared carries with Chester Taylor very early in his career. Meanwhile, Ezekiel Elliot did not really have a viable backup that could share some of the workload with him. Elliot received over 300 carries in 3 of his first 4 years and the only reason he didn’t receive over 300 in his second seasons was because he missed games due to a suspension.

Final Verdict

The true reason people devalue the running back position is because star running backs have not been on Super Bowl winning teams in recent years. This situation has caused many to believe they are not needed on such a team. By having this belief, they then form the subsequent mindset that some other non-quarterback positions are quintessential towards building a Super Bowl caliber team.

As a result, many scoff or even get upset when they see a team, especially their favorite team, invest resources (money and or draft capital) on the running back position because they believe such resources should have spent on other non-quarterback positions that they believe are more “important” for building a Super Bowl winning team. This mindset is the true cause leading to the view that “running backs don’t matter” because it basically says that having an elite running back is pointless because it can actually be a hindrance towards winning a Super Bowl because resources spent to acquire and keep one could be used for other positions. This is where the fallacy of such a mindset lies.

The reality, as stated earlier, is that these non-quarterback positions are not significantly more impactful than others when forming a Super Bowl team. All that matters is that you have a handful of elite players that play with a very good to great quarterback (that plays well when it matters) with good coaching. Also, a Super Bowl team should have a collection of solid to good players that compliment that quarterback and the handful of elite players in which the culture, identity, scheme, and style of play is built around. A Super Bowl winning team can have a combination of elite non-quarterbacks be an elite wide receiver, left tackle, defensive end, right guard, and left corner. Another example could be an elite center, defensive tackle, middle linebacker, tight end, and another edge rusher. The aforementioned example of the 2013 Seahawks had an elite running back, center, cornerback, and two safeties. You have to just get a handful of elite players with complimentary solid to good players that with ideally an elite quarterback.

If the quarterback is just very good then you might either need a few more elite players or for the few you have to literally be the best at their positions rather than top 5. By unfortunate coincidence, many elite running backs haven’t received the chance to play with elite quarterbacks in the last decade, thus reducing the likelihood of them being on Super Bowl teams. This has led to the false narrative that running backs don’t matter while the value of other positions get overvalued because a handful of elite players from other positions have had the opportunity to be on the same team with elite quarterbacks like Brady and Mahomes on Super Bowl winning terms.

The value of Rob Gronkowski and Travis Kelce isn’t that they’re tight ends and that somehow tight ends are more important on a Super Bowl winning team than some other few positions. The value lies in that Gronk and Kelce are simply elite players regardless of their position that complimented and helped their all-time quarterbacks (Brady and Mahomes) on Super Bowl runs. Ultimately, people’s negative perception of the running back is skewed by false assumptions and inaccurate deductions made in relation to the contributions of an elite running back compared to that of non-quarterback elite players on Super Bowl contending teams.